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RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY OF SURFACE CARRIERS
SEEKING TO FLY
PRESIDENT KENNEDY, in a recent message to Congress, vigorously recom-
mended the elimination of obstacles to free competition in transportation. He
pointed to the existence of distortions and inefficiencies inherent in existing
federal policies, and advocated equality of opportunity for all forms of trans-
portation and greater reliance on the forces of competition rather than the re-
straints of regulation.1 This Comment examines a particular obstacle to re-
source mobility: the legal barrier to surface carrier participation in air trans-
portation. This restriction is found in section 408 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act,2 one of the transportation statutes to which the President referred.
The Civil Aeronautics Act was enacted as part of a network of statutes
regulating the various modes of transportation. 3 The act vested in the Civil
Aeronautics Board extensive control over the entry, rates, and ownership of
commercial air carriers.4 Section 401 requires all air carriers, including
passenger, cargo carriers, and air forwarders, to obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity or an exemption before conducting air transport
operations.' Subsection (e), the grandfather clause, assured certification of
any applicant who established that he had continuously operated as an air
carrier for a specified period prior to the passage of the act.6 All other applicants
must prove, pursuant to section 401 (d), that they are "fit, willing, and able"
to perform the proposed service and that such service is required by the
"public convenience and necessity."' 7 This latter entry requirement had
through its long use in railroad regulation acquired a reasonably definite
meaning; the carrier had to show a positive need for its service, or, in other
words, the inadequacy of existing services.8 The policies set out in section 2
1. See text of the President's message to Congress on transportation, N.Y. Times, April
6, 1962, p. 18, col. 2.
2. 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1958). All textual citations of sections of
the Civil Aeronautics Act and all citations of that act from the Statutes at Large will refer
to Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973-1030 (1938).
3. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27
(1940) (trucking) ; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-86 (1958) (aviation) ; Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, 929 (1940),
49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1940) (water carriage).
4. Section 401, 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1958) (entry) ; § 403, 52 Stat.
992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1958) (rates) ; § 408, 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1378
(1958) (ownership).
5. Section 401(a), 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1958). Section 1(2),
which defines "air carrier," empowers the Board to exempt air forwarders from the pro-
visions of the act, see notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
6. Section 401(e), 52 Stat. 988 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (1958).
7. Section 401(d), 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1958).
8. It appeared in the Transportation Act of 1920, § 402, 41 Stat. 477 (1920), 49 U.S.C. §
1(18)-(20) (1958), and was construed in Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Northside Belt Ry., 276
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of the act, however, have somewhat modified this traditional interpretation of
"public convenience and necessity." These policies include "encouragement
and development" of air transportation, its regulation in such manner "as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree
of safety in, and faster sound economic c~nditions in, such transportation,"
"promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges," and "competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development" of the air industry.9 Furthermore, the restrictive proviso
of section 408, designed to limit surface carrier participation in air transport,
presents another factor for the Board to consider in licensing air carriers.
Section 408 requires approval of the CAB for consolidations, mergers,
purchases, leases, operating contracts, or acquisitions of control of two or more
air carriers, an air carrier and a surface carrier, or an air carrier and a busi-
ness engaged in any other phase of aeronautics,10 and it prescribes criteria for
the approval of these transactions." Besides a general standard that the trans-
action be consistent with the "public interest," section 408 includes two
provisos. The first proviso requires that the transaction not result in creating
a monopoly or monopolies, thereby restraining competition or jeopardizing
another air carrier that is not a party to the transaction. The second proviso,
particularly pertinent to surface carrier ownership, states that if application is
made by "a carrier other than an air carrier," the Board may deny approval
unless it finds that:
the transaction proposed will promote the public interest by enabling such
carrier other than an air carrier to use aircraft to public advantage in its
operation and will not unduly restrain competition.12
Believing that the proviso was intended to be extremely restrictive in section
408 proceedings, the Board has held that only those air transport operations
which are "auxiliary and supplementary" to surface transport services come
within the purview of the "use aircraft to public advantage in its operations"
requirement.13 Thus, a surface carrier acquiring control of an air carrier must
show "physical integration" of the use of aircraft in its surface operations.' 4
The dearth of cases in which a surface carrier has successfully fulfilled this
condition is understandable, since air operations are hardly physically inte-
grated with rail, shipping, and trucking services.' 5 Because the restriction on
U.S. 475 (1928). For a discussion of public convenience and necessity in rail and trucking
regulation, see Note, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers,
71 YALE L.J. 307,309-11 (1961).
9. Section 2,52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
10. Section 408(a), 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1958).
11. Section 408(b), 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1958).
12. Section 408(b), 52 Stat. 1002 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1958).
13. American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619, 624 (1942) (remand opinion).
14. American Export Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 104, 111 (1943) (supplemental opinion).
15. See FULDA, COMPrTITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIEs: TRANSPORTATION f§ 12.15-.16
(1961).
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surface carrier participation in air carriage is set forth in a proviso, an applica-
tion under section 408 that fails to meet the specific requirements of that
proviso must be disapproved, notwithstanding that the other policies of the
act would be promoted by approval of the application.
The surface carrier proviso reflects a congressional concern during the late
thirties with the dangers of intermodal ownership among transportation media.
In the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 Congress enacted a similar provision in-
hibiting railroad participation in trucking.16 This provision provided the
model for the surface carrier proviso in the Civil Aeronautics Act. In fact,
the CAB's construction of the surface carrier proviso to require "auxiliary
and supplementary" operations was borrowed from the experience of the ICC in
elaborating the similar restriction on the acquistions of motor carriers.17 Further-
more, the Transportation Act of 1940 incorporated a prohibition forbidding
any railroad or other common carrier from having an interest in a water
carrier operating through the Panama Canal or elsewhere "with which such
carrier.., does or may compete for traffic."'
8
Section 408 is the only provision of the act which explicitly refers to sur-
face carrier participation in air carriage. When a surface carrier merges with,
or acquires control of, a licensed air carrier, the limiting proviso of section 408
unquestionably comes into play. But should a surface carrier or its subsidiary
request operating authority under section 401, the applicability of section 408's
second proviso or its policy is not clear, since the language of section 401
does not explicitly require surface carrier applicants, or applicants controlled
by surface carriers, to meet special qualifications. Public convenience and
necessity, as defined traditionally or in the act, does not incorporate a restric-
tion on surface carrier participation.
16. Section 213(a) (1), 49 Stat. 556 (1935), now § 5(2) (b), 54 Stat. 906 (1940), as
amended, Act of August 2, 1949, ch. 379, § 3, 63 Stat. 485 (1949), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (b)
(1958).
17. See American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619, 624 (1942) ; see generally, Hickey,
Surface Carrier Participation in Air Transportation Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 36
GEo. L.J. 125, 144-53 (1948) ; Tomlinson, Surface Carrier Participation in Air Transporta-
tion, 34 GEo. L.J. 64, 71 (1946). But see Baggett, The Right of Steamship Carriers to
Participate in Transoceanic Air Service, 12 ICC PRAc. J. 3, 8-13 (1944) ; James, Control of
One Form of Transportation by Another, 12 ICC PRAc. J. 214, 220 (1944). For a descrip-
tion of the "auxiliary and supplementary" standard as used by the ICC, see Special Study
Group on Transportation Policies in the United States, Preliminary Draft of a Report
on National Transportation Policy, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 140-42 (Comm. print 1961). For
an analysis of the ICC's elaboration of the Motor Carrier Act, see Fulda, Rail-Motor
Competition: Motor-Carrier Operations by Railroads, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 156 (1959), and
Note, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers, 71 YALE L.J.
307 (1961).
18. The prohibition was originally contained in the Panama Canal Act of 1912, ch. 390,
§ 11, 37 Stat. 560, 566 (1912), as amended, 49 U.S. C. § 5(14) (1940). See Hickey, supra
note 17, at 143; Tomlinson, supra note 17, at 69-71. But see Baggett, supra note 17, at 5-8;
James, supra note 17, at 217-18.
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The Relationship of Sections 401 and 408
A relationship between the proviso of section 408 and certification of surface
carriers under section 401 was first established in the American Export case.19
American Export Airlines, a subsidiary of American Export Lines, Inc. (here-
after referred to as Steamship Company), applied for operating authority to
conduct air carrier service over the North Atlantic trade route. Since Ameri-
can Export Airlines was a subsidiary of "a carrier other than an air carrier,"
the applicant also requested that the Board approve, under section 408, its
control by Steamship Company, "if such approval is deemed necessary." At
the time of these proceedings the only American air carrier rendering trans-
atlantic service was Pan American Airways Company, which intervened in op-
position to American Export's application. Although recognizing that the
intervener had pioneered the route under consideration and that it was oper-
ating efficiently within the limits of its facilities, the Board found that there
was sufficient traffic on the route to support another air carrier and that ad-
ditional competition from a second United States carrier would be desirable.
The Board thus concluded that the service proposed by American Export
Airlines was demanded by the public convenience and necessity.20
The Board then proceeded to dispose of the application for approval under
section 408. Applicant had asserted that because the acquisition of its stock
by Steamship Company antedated the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, there
was no acquisition requiring the Board's approval. Counsel for intervener
and for the CAB insisted that a section 408 question was properly before the
Board. They contended that despite the fact that the acquisition of applicant
as a corporate entity occurred before passage of the act, the acquisition of an
air carrier would not take place until the corporate entity became an air
carrier-upon receiving a certificate and actually undertaking air transport
operations. The Board enunciated its own solution to the section 408 problem
in this case; it found that section 408 applied:
to cases involving the control of air carriers only where the acquistion of
control of a corporate entity occurs at a time when that entity is already
an air carrier.
21
Because the applicant was not an air carrier when Steamship Company ac-
quired control, the Board dismissed the application filed under section 408.2
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in revieving the American
Export decision in Pan American Airways Co. v. CAB,2 3 agreed with the
Board that the act does not require a surface carrier or an applicant controlled
19. 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940), rev'd it part sub nora. Pan Am. Airways Co. v. CAB, 121
F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941), remanded, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942), supplemental proceeding, 4 C.A.B.
104 (1943).
20. American Export Airlines, 2 C.A.B. 16, 32-34 (1940) (initial opinion).
21. Id. at 46.
22. Id. at 46, 47.
23. 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941).
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by a surface carrier to meet the standard of section 408(b)'s second proviso
as a condition precedent to receiving a certificate of public convenience and
necessity in a section 401 licensing proceeding.24 But the court rejected the
Board's "literal" construction of section 408, holding that the statutory
language of section 408 (a) -- "to acquire control of any air carrier in any man-
ner whatsoever"-includes not only the acquisition of corporate control
through the purchase of stock but also the subsidiary's subsequent action of
obtaining operating authority to carry on air transport services. Instead of
viewing the purchase of a controlling interest in a subsidiary as one trans-
action and the obtaining of a certificate from the CAB as another, the court
conceptually lumped these two occurrences together and viewed them as parts
of a single transaction. Any other interpretation, the court concluded, would
enable a surface carrier to escape the requirements of the second proviso
of section 408(b) merely by organizing a subsidiary for air carriage.25
On remand,26 the CAB found that the relationship between Steamship Com-
pany and its air carrier subsidiary failed to meet the requirement of the second
proviso in spite of American Export's contention that the two companies
would be able to achieve substantial economies by coordinating communication,
meteorological and navigation facilities, and traffic and other operating func-
tions. The Board asserted that a showing on any or all of these points would
be insufficient, since the proposed air services would nevertheless fail to be
"auxiliary and supplementary" to Steamship Company's surface operations.
Consequently, Steamship Company was ordered to divest itself of control of
American Export Airlines. 27 The Board's remand opinion also contained sig-
nificant dicta with regard to the applicability of the second proviso of section
408(b) in a section 401 certification proceeding. Since it is unreasonable to
distinguish between entry of a surface carrier's subsidiary and entry of the
surface carrier itself, and since the court found that Congress intended the
second proviso to apply directly in the former case, the Board announced that
it would treat the policy of the second proviso as controlling in all section 401
licensing proceedings.
2 8
Although this conclusion seems sound, given the holding of the court in
Pan American, the court's treatment of an acquisition of a paper subsidiary
as it would an acquisition of an operating air carrier is questionable. For there
24. Id. at 815-16.
25. Id. at 815.
26. American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942) (remand opinion), 4 C.A.B. 106
(1943) (supplemental opinion).
27. 4 C.A.B. at 112. The divestiture order was met by a transfer of control to American
Airlines. Steamship Company retained its stock ownership in American Export Airlines
while American Airlines purchased authorized but theretofore unissued stock of the latter
corporation. The transaction gave American Airlines 51.4% of applicant's issued and out-
standing stock. The CAB granted its approval of this transaction in American Airlines, 6
C.A.B. 371 (1945).
28. 3 C.A.B. at 625. The Board's dicta was contrary to the holding of the Second
Circuit on this issue. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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is no functional difference between entry by a surface carrier in its own name
and by a surface carrier through its subsidiary. In the former case, only section
401 is applicable, and the court held that section 408(b)'s second proviso was
not a controlling standard in this type of certification proceeding,29 while in the
latter case the court held that the standards of the second proviso were to be
literally applied.30
On the other hand, the decision of the Board in the first American Export
case, based upon the express terms of the two sections of the act, does seem sup-
portable. The differentiation in the act of entry of a surface carrier or a surface
carrier subsidiary and surface carrier acquisition of a licensed air carrier rests
upon a distinction between buying-into and building-into an air transport
market. Since American Export acquired a paper subsidiary, rather than an
operating air carrier, and actually established and developed new air trans-
port services, 31 it was obviously diversifying by expansion rather than by
merger. Congress may have required that "buying in" be subject to different
standards than "building in," since the latter transaction provides the market
with a new competitor while the former merely involves the change of con-
trol of an existing competitor.3 2 The fact that section 401 does not impose
special requirements upon surface carriers applying for certificates of public
convenience and necessity-and section 408 requires surface carriers seeking
approval of "acquisition of control" over air carriers to meet special standards-
suggests that Congress was less concerned with surface carrier expansion than
with surface carrier acquisitionA3
29. Pan American Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810,815-16 (2d Cir. 1941).
30. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
31. An essential step in the creation of a subsidiary is, at some point, the parent corpora-
tion's giving the new corporation assets in exchange for a controlling interest in it, and in
this sense it is accurate to speak of the "acquisition" of a paper subsidiary. For a descrip-
tion of American Export's plans for development of air operations, see 2 C.A.B. at 35-42.
32. A firm seeking to enter a new market will most likely find it easier to buy into it
rather than to build into it. The following advantages to the firm of buying over building
have been suggested: (1) New facilities can be purchased more quickly than they can be
built. (2) Since securities of the acquired firm are frequently selling below the replacement
cost of its assets, it is often cheaper to buy. (3) The purchase of another firm may bring
specialized know-how or managerial ability (though in reality this is but a variant of the
proceeding point since talent of this sort presumably could be "bought" at some price). (4)
Buying an existing firm provides a certain security, in that it may assure the acquiring firm
of products or services that have already proved themselves in the market. (5) An acquisi-
tion can sometimes be financed more easily than new construction, since stockholders of the
acquired firm may be more willing to accept shares of the acquiring company than investors
would be to take such shares at a public distribution. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 302-03 (1960).
33. In its remand opinion, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942), the Board hinted that it had the build-
ing-buying distinction in mind when, in its first American Export opinion, 2 C.A.B. 16
(1940), it dismissed the § 408 application. It remarked:
The Board construed the provisions [of § 408] as applying only to the acquisitions of
air carriers actually engaged in air transportation and as not therefore applying to
subsidiaries created for the purpose of initally developing an air transportation enter-
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The creeping control doctrine of the Pan American case did not affect those
surface owned air carriers who were conducting air transport operations prior
to the effective date of the act.34 When the Board was faced with an air carrier
holding a "grandfather" certificate in Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 5 it
held section 408 inapplicable since the applicants had not acquired control of the
airline subsequent to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The CAB
made no mention of the grandfather clause, but observed that Congress must
have been aware of surface carrier control at the time the act was passed,
pointed to the prospective nature of the language of section 408, and noted
the traditional disfavor of courts toward interpretations giving retroactive
effect to legislation. The control relationship in American Export had also been
effected prior to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act; American Export
pointed to this fact in support of its contention that no question arose under sec-
tion 408. The American Export case is distinguishable, however, from Railroad
Control of Northeast Airlines, since American Export involved the post-enact-
ment increase of surface carrier control over an air carrier; only after the effec-
tive date of the act did the surface carrier subsidiary become an air carrier.36
Thus, the control of American Export Airlines by Steamship Company did not
involve substantial pre-enactment investment to the extent of full-blown opera-
tions in air carriage, as did the railroad's control in Northeast. This distinction
seems to furnish a functional basis for the Board's regarding section 408 as
prise. Under such a construction, it logically would follow that the Board would
conclude that Congress in enacting the Act could not have regarded as necessarily
inconsistent with the public interest the entrance into the air transportation field of
carriers engaged in other forms of transportation where such an entry was ac-
complished by the initial establishment and development of new air transport ser-
vices.
3 C.A.B. at 625.
34. Two pre-enactment control relationships which have found their way into antitrust
litigation are the ownership of Hawaiian Airlines by Inter-Island Steam Nay. Co., Hawaiian
Airlines v. Trans-Pac. Airlines, 78 F. Supp. 1 (D. Hawaii 1948) ; United States v. Inter-
Island Steam Nay. Co., 87 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Hawaii 1950) ; and the half ownership of
Pan Am.- Grace Airways ("Panagra') by W. R. Grace & Co. (the other half owner being
Pan Am. World Airways), United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), prob. jurls. noted, 368 U.S. 966 (1962).
35. 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943). The CAB proceeding was occasioned by a refinancing in
1940 which resulted in a reduction of the equity holdings of the Boston and Maine Railroad
and of the Maine Central Railroad in Northeast Airlines. 4 C.A.B. at 383. The railroads
were apprehensive that the refinancing might be considered an "acquisition of control"
within the meaning of § 408, and thus requested a Board decision to the effect that either the
section was inapplicable or, if applicable, that its provisions were not violated. Id. at 380.
Northeast Airlines, which until the 1940 transaction was named Boston-Maine Airways,
had been organized by the two railroads in 1931. Id. at 382.
36. At the time of the initial proceeding, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940), American Export Air-
lines had made only survey flights. Id. at 39-40. The Board later granted it a certificate
permitting temporary service betveen New York and Foynes, Ireland. 3 C.A.B. 294
(1941). Pursuant to this certificate, American Export Airlines commenced operations on
June 20, 1942.3 C.A.B. 619,621 (1942).
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"prospective only" in Northeast, while seeming to give it retroactive effect in
American Export.3 7
The position taken in the remand opinion of American Export that section
408(b)'s second proviso applies as a controlling standard in all section 401
proceedings was soon overruled in American President Lines.35 Noting that
section 401 contains no language restricting surface carrier entry, the Board
held that a surface carrier, applying for a certificate in its own name, rather
than through a subsidiary, which would trigger section 408 under the Pan
American doctrine, need not comply with the second proviso as "a legal condi-
tion" to being certificated.
Had Congress intended such compliance to be a legal condition to certifica-
tion, the Board reasoned, it would have included a surface carrier restriction
either in section 401 or in section 2's enumeration of factors to be considered
in determining the "public convenience and necessity." The Board believed,
however, that section 408(b)'s second proviso should be treated as a "statu-
tory standard," explaining:
There is a significant difference between a legal condition to Board action
and a statutory standard to be considered in reaching a judgment. The
former is rigid in its requirement and leaves the Board no discretion as
to its application; the latter is a guide which, with other appropriate
standards, lights the way to a judgment based on sound discretion."
The Board pointed out that this interpretation of the interrelationship of
sections 401 and 408 was in conformity with the ICC experience in regulating
railroad entry into trucking under the Motor Carrier Act.40
37. The Board may be able to bring the policies ascribed to § 408(b)'s second proviso to
bear on surface carrier control of a grandfather certificated airline under § 401 (h), 52 Stat.
989 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1960) (authority to modify, suspend, or revoke certifi-
cates). In Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pac. Airlines, 78 F. Supp. 1 (D. Hawaii 1948), de-
fendent alleged, in a cross-complaint, that the control of plaintiff by Inter-Island Steam Nay.
Co. violated the antitrust laws. Plaintiff defended against this charge by contending that the
CAB had "primary jurisdiction" over this issue because the Board could attack its pre-
enactment control relationship under § 401 (h) and, in that manner, apply the policies behind
§ 408(b)'s second proviso to it. Id. at 4. The district judge, in denying that the Board had
"primary jurisdiction," commented:
To say as defendants [on the cross-complaint] do that it [the CAB] could threaten
Hawaiian with suspension of its certificate unless Inter-Island did what the Board
might say should be done, does not impress me as either plausible or practical.
Agencies no more than courts waste their efforts on useless orders. If the threat
should be executed its lawfulness would be litigated while the public stood stranded.
Id. at 9.
38. 7 C.A.B. 799 (1947). This case arose from a petition filed by nine steamship lines re-
questing a general investigation of one aspect of surface carrier air participation. The
decision, rejecting the request, is in the nature of a declaratory judgment on the relationship
of §§ 401 and 408. For an excellent presentation of the position taken by various CAB mem-
bers in this case, see Comment, Participation of Steamship Companies in Air Transportation,
34 CORNELL L.Q. 588 (1949).
39. 7 C.A.B. at 802.
40. Id. at 804-07. For a description of the ICC experience, see Fulda, snpra note 17,
at 180-97.
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The discretionary treatment of section 408 in entry proceedings was not,
however, extended to those situations in which the applicant for a certificate is
a subsidiary of a surface carrier. Although Parks Investigation Case
41 sug-
gests that the second proviso is not controlling in entry of a surface carrier
subsidiary, the Board held, in accordance with the Pan American doctrine,
that the grant of a certificate would automatically trigger section 408. This
fact was sufficient reason for the denial of a certificate.4 Moreover, in the
Southeastern Area Local Service case,43 decided in 1957, the Board denied
a certificate to Southeast Airlines, which was wholly owned by Mason
and Dixon Lines, a common carrier of freight by motor truck. This parentage,
the Board observed, would bar the award of a certificate to Southeast unless
certification were conditioned upon prior divestment of control by the parent
company. But the Board noted that Southeast was so intertwined with Mason
and Dixon Lines in matters of financing, facilities, and managerial talent that,
were the airline divested from its surface carrier parent, the applicant's fitness
and ability would be vitiated. Thus Southeast was condemned by operation of
the second proviso of section 408(b) if it retained its surface parentage and
condemned by operation of the fitness and ability test of section 401(d) if
it became a corporate orphan.
The Board apparently did not appreciate the implications if its American
President Lines holding that the surface carrier proviso would be treated as a
"statutory standard" rather than as a "legal condition" in section 401 proceed-
ings. It seemed to regard the approach announced there as discretionary only in
the sense that the presumption raised against surface carrier entry by the appli-
cant's failure to show that the proposed service would be "auxiliary and sup-
41. 11 C.A.B. 779 (1950), aff'd sub norn. Continental Southern Lines v. CAB, 197
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 US. 831 (1952).
42. Continental Southern Lines, a bus company, had applied in its own name for
certificates of public convenience and necessity, but during the proceedings, Continental
Southern contracted to sell all its stock to Transcontinental Bus Company, an operating
and holding company likewise engaged in motor carriage. Thus, Continental Southern, al-
though itself a surface carrier applying in its own name for certification, became the sub-
sidiary of a surface carrier with the result that should a certificate be granted to it, §
408 would be brought into play. Nonetheless the two bus companies urged the CAB to
certificate Continental Southern. The Board saw two problems which would arise were
it to certificate Southern Continental and then find in a subsequent § 408 proceeding that the
bus companies were unable to satisfy the terms of the second proviso. First, it observed:
If this should be the result of the 408 case, we would then be legally required to order
Transcontinental to divest itself of control of Continental Southern. There is no
assurance that Transcontinental would take this action. If it did not, and preferred
to retain its control of Continental Southern purely as a bus operation, our action
in certificating Continental Southern in this proceeding would have been futile.
11 C.A.B. at 788. In addition, the Board noted that it lacked assurance that the bus com-
panies would be willing to make the substantial investments necessary for immediate activa-
tion of the routes involved in this case pending the outcome of a § 408 proceeding. Ibid.
43. Docket No. 7038 (CAB Sept. 29, 1958), aff'd sub norn. Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v.
CAB, 283 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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plementary" could be overcome by a showing that the service was "required"
by the "public interest." But since "auxiliary and supplementary" air carriage,
unlike rail owned motor carrier service, is not feasible, the Board would almost
invariably find that the surface carrier applicant had failed to meet its integral-
ity test of section 408(b)'s second proviso. Thus, in every surface carrier
entry case, the CAB would have to weigh the effect of the entrant's non-
compliance with the proviso against the public convenience and necessity of the
proposed air service. But the balance is incomplete without a consideration
not of the lack of "auxiliary and supplementary" services but of the reasons
for inhibiting surface carrier participation in air transportation. This discre-
tionary judgment thus necessitates a departure from the literal terms of the pro-
viso to an examination of the policy believed to be embodied therein. The Board's
mention in American President Lines of the dangers that Congress might
have had in mind when it enacted the restrictive proviso indicates the Board's
awareness of this additional factor which a full determination of the public
interest entails. Indeed, in those cases in which the CAB has viewed section
408 as a discretionary guide instead of a legal condition, it has not considered
the express terms of the proviso at all, but the policy behind it.
An examination of situations where indirect air carriers controlled by rail-
road, trucking, and shipping companies have applied for operating authority
indicates the manner in which the Board treats the second proviso of section
408(b) when it is weighed as one of several factors relevant to a determina-
tion of the propriety of entry rather than as a per se bar to entry. Subsequent
analysis will consider the possibility and advisability of applying the dis-
cretionary standards of the forwarder cases to the entry applications of both
surface carriers and surface carrier subsidiaries.
The Experience in Indirect Air Carriage
Section 1(2) of the Civil Aeronautics Act defines air carrier to mean any
company which engages, directly or indirectly, in air transportation and pro-
vides that the Board may exempt air carriers not directly engaged in the
operation of aircraft from the provisions of the act.44 An indirect carrier-the
type referred to in the exemption clause of section 1 (2)--operates no aircraft.
Rather it, hereafter called an air forwarder, collects and consolidates cargo
from various shippers and transfers such cargo to an airline and receives ship-
ments at the terminal airport, "breaks bulk," and distributes the shipment's
components to the ultimate consignees. The forwarder takes advantage of the
lower rates for large volume shipments and, to some extent, passes this ad-
vantage along to its customers, who individually lack sufficient volume to any
44. 52 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1958). Section 1(2) reads:
"Air carrier" means any citizen of the United States who undertakes, whether direct-
ly or indirectly or by a lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transporta-
tion: Provided, That the Authority may by order relieve air carriers who are not
directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air transportation from the provisions
of this chapter to the extent and for such periods as may be in the public interest.
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particular destination to qualify for these lower rates. An indirect carrier may
also perform various traffic management 45 functions for the shipper. Ap-
parently because of the lack of experience with air forwarders in 1938,46
Congress provided that the Board may exempt such carriers from the terms of
the act.
In an early forwarder entry proceeding, the Board granted a temporary
exemption without reference to the fact of surface carrier control.47 Railway
Express Agency, the first forwarder applicant, had engaged in "air express"
forwarding under contracts with substantially all domestic air carriers and
sought authorization under the grandfather clause to continue its operations.
Although the grandfather provision instructed the CAB to grant a certificate
upon a showing that the applicant was an air carrier, continuously operating, dur-
ing a specified pre-enactment period, the Board, believing that the language of
section 401 (e) only contemplated actual air operations, concluded that this clause
neither required nor authorized the issuance of a grandfather certificate to in-
direct carriers.48 It did find, however, that a grant of a temporary exemption
45. See Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 490-92 (1948); Emery, The
Freight Forwarder and the Development of Air Freight, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 29,
30-33 (1950).
46. Prior to 1948, only Railway Express Agency was engaged in indirect air carriage.
See Railway Express Agency, 2 C.A.B. 531 (1941) ; Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B.
473,491 (1948).
47. Railway Express Agency, 2 C.A.B. 531 (1941). REA's authorized capital consisted
of 1000 shares of no-par value stock, of which all but six shares were owned by railroads, as
indicated in Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 478 (1948). The six shares were
held by Canadian National Realities, Ltd., in trust. Ibid.
48. The CAB pointed out that the certificate issued pursuant to the grandfather clause
authorized its recipient to engage in air transportation "between the terminal and inter-
mediate points during which it ... so continuously operated" during the grandfather period.
2 C.A.B. at 539. The Board reasoned that by referring to operations "between terminal and
intermediate points" the clause contemplated physical operations conducted directly by an
applicant between such points. Id. at 540. As REA's activities had not included the physical
operation of aircraft between terminal and intermediate points, the CAB surmised that
the language of § 401(e) could not be said to include within its scope REA's activities. Ibid.
The Board observed further that a certificate issuing under § 401(e) must authorize the ap-
plicant to engage in air transportation "with respect to all classes of traffic for which the
authorization is sought, except mail." It commented:
If operations like the applicant's fall within the section, the Board in the light of
the plain meaning of this language would have no alternative but to authorize ap-
plicant to engage in the transportation of passengers, if such a request were made. It
would be absurd to attribute such an intention to Congress and such a result is
entirely inconsistent with the general purposes of section 401(e) as we understand
them.
2 C.A.B. at 540-41. This latter ground for finding the grandfather clause inapplicable to
indirect carriers is clearly inadequate. Section 401 (e) permits the Board to refuse a grand-
father certificate to an applicant whose service during the prescribed period was "inadequate
and inefficient.' 52 Stat. 988 (1938). Surely an applicant whose air carriage service had
been confined to express or freight forwarding would be found to have rendered "inadequate"
service to qualify it for a grandfather certificate authorizing it to engage in passenger
transportation.
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to REA would be in the public interest.49 In the other early forwarder de-
cision, Universal Air Freight,50 the Board denied an exemption to a surface
carrier controlled forwarder without mentioning its surface affiliations.
The next air forwarder proceeding was in 1948, when the Board, believing that
the admission of a substantial number of forwarders into air transportation
would benefit the industry,51 consolidated the applications of 78 ai'r forwarders
seeking authorization to engage in air forwarding.52 In passing on REA's ap-
plication for continued operating authority, the Board, for the first time, con-
sidered the relationship between REA and its railroad affiliations. It held
that the relationship between REA and the railroads failed to bring section
408 directly into play because REA was wholly owned and controlled by the
railroads before the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act, and such ownership
had not been extended or modified since its enactment. The Board cited
Northeast Airlines and concluded that no section 408 issue could be raised as
long as the ownership and control relationship remained unaltered.53 Al-
though the grandfather clause had been found inapplicable to air forwarders,
this reliance on Northeast is justifiable in light of the fact that in both cases
the applicant had been engaged in pre-enactment full-blown air operations."4
49. 2 C.A.B. at 541. The exemption was from the requirement of § 401(a) that an air
carrier may not operate without a certificate. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. But
certain provisions of the act, the Board commented, applied in terms to "air carriers," were
nonetheless "obviously inapplicable" to air carriers of the indirect type. The proviso in §
1 (2), it felt, clearly recognized this situation. Id. at 537.
The Board noted that an examination into the contracts between REA and the airlines
was pending, and deferred until then further consideration of REA's operating authority.
Id. at 541. But in the opinion in that case, Railway Express Agreements, 4 C.A.B.
157 (1943), nothing was said regarding the exemption under which REA was operating.
Presumably the temporary exemption granted in the first CAB case involving REA, 2
C.A.B. 531 (1941), continued in effect until renewed in Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9
C.A.B. 473, 489 (1948).
50. 3 C.A.B. 698 (1942). Universal Air Freight Corporation was the wholly owned
subsidiary of United States Freight Corporation, whose other subsidiaries included surface
forwarding companies, trucking and cartage companies and a warehousing company. United
States Freight Corporation was controlled by Linden Securities Corporation, a holding
company affiliated with the New York Central Railroad. See Air Freight Forwarder Case,
9 C.A.B. 473, 511 (1948) ; MooDY'S INDUSmIAL MANUAL 1348 (1939). The Board con-
tended that air forwarding activities which had been carried on by Universal constituted
engaging in air carriage, and charged that Universial had violated § 401 (a) by failing to
secure authorization. Universal requested that the CAB exempt it under § 1(2). The
Board found that Universal's business had been carried on at a loss and that respondent had
not generated new traffic in sufficient volume so as to have any substantial effect on airline
revenues. These observations led the Board to conclude that the public interest did not
require exempting Universal. 3 C.A.B. at 707-08.
51. The Board, however, limited the exemptions granted under § 1 (2)-which was the
mode of authorization selected by the Board in dealing with indirect air carriers-to five
years. See 9 C.A.B. at 498.
52. Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473 (1948).
53. Id. at 485.
54. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra and note 62 infra. REA's failure to secure a
grandfather certificate was not because its pre-enactment operations were any less full
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The second proviso of section 408 was held not to be directly controlling. But
the CAB, in fact, considered the policy behind restricting surface carrier parti-
cipation in air carriage in deciding whether to extend REA's exemption. The
Board noted that some apprehension had been expressed that railroad owner-
ship of REA might be inconsistent with the public interest and have an ad-
verse effect on the development of potential air express services, but found
such fears unwarranted in light of REA's past performances as an air express
forwarder, 5
The 1948 proceeding gave the Board further occasion to deal with questions
of surface carrier participation in indirect air carriage. Several applicants were
surface forwarders or surface forwarder subsidiaries (a surface forwarder
functions in the same manner in relation to railroads, motor carriers, and water
carriers as air forwarders do in relation to direct air carriers). With regard
to surface forwarders applying for operating authorization in their own names,
the Board asserted that it possessed discretion under American President
Lines to weigh what it considered to be the policy of section 408(b)'s second
proviso. Part of that policy was to ensure that surface transportation would
not be promoted at the expense of air transportation. The CAB observed
that participation in air freight forwarding by these surface forwarders would
not be detrimental to the promotion of air operations, because surface for-
warders, unlike the railroads, do not have substantial investments in trans-
portation facilities to protect, and because the presence of competition among
a large number of independent air freight forwarders would, in any case,
deter the participating surface forwarders from diverting a substantial amount
of traffic from air to surface transportation. Moreover, the CAB noted that
the shipper, and not the forwarder, would generally stipulate the mode of
transportation to be used." It also considered whether entry by these surface
forwarders would violate the antimonopoly policy of the first proviso of sec-
tion 408(b).
Because of the number of independent air freight forwarders whom we are
authorizing in this opinion to engage in air freight forwarding operations,
we find further that the conduct of air freight forwarding operations by
surface freight forwarders in question will not give rise to monopoly and
thereby restrain competition or jeopardize any direct air carrier or any
indirect air carrier.r'
The application of subsidiaries of surface forwarders afforded the Board an
opportunity to re-examine the expansive view of an acquisition of control
established in the Pan American decision. The Board responded by holding that
the creeping control doctrine still applied to subsidiaries of surface carriers; but
it also found that the air operations requirement of section 408's second proviso
blown than those of Northeast but only because REA was an indirect air carrier. See note 48
supra and accompanying text.
55. See 9 C.A.B. at 485.
56. Id. at 502.
57. Ibid.
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was not to be considered in air forwarder licensing proceedings, reasoning that
the "use aircraft" language in that section referred only to direct air carriage.58
Although the CAB's rather literal reading of the second proviso is question-
able, the result of this interpretation is to treat subsidiaries of surface for-
warders in the same manner as surface forwarders in entry proceedings. Thus,
the discretionary policy of restricting surface carrier participation in air trans-
portation and not the more rigid statutory test is the standard for entry into
air forwarding whether the applicant is a surface carrier or a subsidiary of
one.
The policy underlying the second proviso of section 408(b) was further
applied in this proceeding to authorization requests of air forwarders con-
trolled by motor carriers and railroad interests. Because of the limited invest-
ment of motor carriers in surface operations, and because of the usefulness
of motor vehicles in gathering and distributing air cargo, the Board found that
participation by trucking applicants in air forwarding operations would not
result in a conflict of interest between air and surface carriage. 9 Applica-
tion of this reasoning, however, to railroad owned applicants led to the denial
of operating authority or exemptions. The application of National Air Freight
Forwarding Corporation, a subsidiary of a surface forwarder, which was
controlled by the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, the Pere Marquette
Railway Company, and a subsidiary of the Erie Railroad Company, was
denied because the Board believed that the railroads' large fixed investments
in property and equipment not capable of being used in air services would be
likely to furnish an incentive to strive for the development of rail business at
the expense of "full and wholehearted" promotion of air transportation. More-
over, the Board thought that the use of railroad freight houses and extensive
solicitation facilities would create a serious handicap to independent air freight
forwarders seeking to compete for the business.60
58. Id. at 503. This holding was affirmed in American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F2d
903 (7th Cir. 1949).
59. 9 C.A.B. at 506-09.
60. Id. at 509-12. The Board also denied the application of Mississippi Valley Trans-
portation Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Illinois Central Railroad, for
the same reasons. The final applicant with railroad affiliation was Universal Air Freight
Corporation, which had been denied entry in a prior case. See note 50 supra and accompany-
ing text. In the 1948 proceeding, the Board found the record inconclusive as to Universal's
relationship to other subsidiaries of its parent which were engaged in warehousing, package
consolidation, and similar operations. Consequently, the Board dismissed Universal's ap-
plication without prejudice.
In Air Freight Forwarder Case (International), 11 C.A.B. 182 (1949), the Board allowed
these three rail controlled applicants to engage in international air freight forwarding. It
observed that the railroad parents of these applicants were not engaged in foreign or over-
seas transportation. This fact was apparently viewed by the Board as indicating the unlikeli-
hood of a conflict of interest arising which would result in the diversion of normal air
traffic to surface transportation. In addition, the Board seemed to feel that the rail parents'
size and the facilities available to the subsidiaries would not give these rail controlled ap-
plicants such competitive advantages as to present the dangers which the Board feared
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The rail controlled applicant appealed, alleging that the Board had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by denying it permission to operate while granting
such authority to REA and the applicants controlled by motor carriers. Judge
Bazelon, writing for the majority in National Air Freight Forwarding Corp.
v. CAB,61 found that the Board's exemption of REA and the motor carrier
applicants was distinguishable from its denial to the petitioner. REA had
been engaged in substantial pre-enactment operations, which the Board was
permitted to consider even though the grandfather clause did not apply.62
might accompany participation by rail controlled forwarders in domestic air freight forward-
ing.
61. 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
62. The issue of § 408's applicability to the control relationship between REA and its
railroad parents illustrates the conceptual difficulties arising from the creeping control
doctrine of Pan American and the Board's holding in the first REA case that § 401(e), the
grandfather clause, was inapplicable to indirect air carriers. Were REA granted continued
operating authority in the 1948 proceeding, its parents would have no greater control over
an air carrier than prior to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act. On the other hand,
the Board, by refusing to extend the exemption, could have deprived REA's railroad parents
of control over an indirect air carrier subsidiary. Judge Bazelon, for the majority, empha-
sized the lack of increase in control which the grant to REA of continued operating authority
would give its parents. He therefore found the Board's reliance on Northeast a proper
reason for holding § 408 inapplicable to REA. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
Judge Prettyman, in dissent, stressed the fact that the Board was under no compulsion in
the 1948 proceeding to grant an extension of REA's exemption.
The dissent urged that since the Board had earlier found REA outside the purview of the
grandfather clause it could not now rely on the fact that REA had engaged in pre-enactment
operations to avoid the applicability of § 408 under the Pan American doctrine. But the
Northeast case, which held that § 408 does not apply to an air carrier which had engaged
in full-blown operations and which had been controlled by a surface carrier prior to the
effective date of the act, placed no reliance on the grandfather clause. See notes 35-36 supra
and accompanying text. Thus, it was not the fact that Northeast held a grandfather certifi-
cate which excused it from meeting the requirements of § 408 but the fact of its pre-enact-
ment operations. The only standard that the grandfather clause excused carriers such as
Northeast from meeting was the public convenience and necessity test of § 401(d). REA's
pre-enactment operations, which the Board held were not comprehended by the grand-
father clause, while excusing it from meeting the requirements of § 408, have not been the
ground for excusing REA from meeting the public convenience and necessity test. Like
all indirect air carriers, REA has not had to meet the standards of § 401(d) because of
the Board's exempting power under § 1 (2). To secure an exemption under § 1 (2), however,
indirect air carriers, including REA, have had to satisfy that section's public interest test.
See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
In assessing the public interest, both in the case of REA and of the appellant, National Air
Freight Forwarding Corp., the CAB considered the policy ascribed to the surface carrier pro-
viso of § 408. Even if § 408 had been held applicable to REA, the Board's decision that the
terms of the second proviso were inapplicable to air forwarders would have precluded a con-
sideration of anything more than that proviso's policy. In REA's case, the Board found the
policy behind the surface carrier proviso outweighed by REA's record of good performance
in promoting air express forwarding and by the fact that REA's operations pre-dated the
Civil Aeronautics Act. In National's case, the policy of the restrictive proviso was not
outweighed by either good past performance or pre-enactment operations. Thus, the treat-
ment of REA and National, under the public interest test of § 1(2), are distinguishable.
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Moreover, REA's past record in promoting air express justified the conclusion
that the control relationship between REA and its railroad parents would not det-
rimentally affect REA's air forwarding operations. National further argued
that two factors considered by the Board in allowing motor carriers partici-
pation in air freight forwarding were equally pertinent to rail carriers, noting
the Board's assertion that competition of a large number of independent air
freight forwarders would deter the participating surface forwarders from
diverting any substantial amount of traffic from air to surface transportation, and
that the shipper, and not the forwarder, would generally designate the means
of transportation to be used. Although the court apparently agreed with Na-
tional on this point, it found that the Board's distinction between motor car-
rier control and railroad control, based upon the difference in surface invest-
ment of the two, was sufficient to justify a denial to National.6 3
Judge Prettyman's dissent in National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v.
CAB represents the first elaborate application of the economic reasons for
restricting surface carrier participation in air carriage to a particular surface
carrier requesting operating authority. Judge Prettyman compared National's
relative capacity to divert normal air freight traffic to its rail operations with
REA's capacity to divert air express to its surface operations:
[I]n the forwarding of air freight there will be some fifty competitors,
whereas in the air express business there will be none. If the railroads
should press for the shipment of express by rail instead of by air, the
pressure would be effective, because their subsidiary is the only express
forwarding agency. But if the railroad controlling one out of fifty-some
freight forwarders tried to divert air business to rail movement, it would
seem to me that the other competing air freight forwarders, who offer the
service the shipper wants, would very quickly take over the business.
Diversion from one hand to the other of the same railroad-owned
monopoly is one thing, but diversion in the face of a large group of
active competitors is something else.64
Judge Prettyman also thought more emphasis should have been given to the
two factors which were significant in the authorization of the motor carriers, 0
The question to which the D.C. Circuit should have addressed itself, but which neither
the majority nor the dissent directly answered, was whether the distinction satisfies a
standard of reasonableness such that the Board's action could not be reversed as arbitrary
and capricious.
63. See 197 F.2d at 390.
64. Id. at 392. The CAB had distinguished between "express" and "freight" forwarding,
observing that the image of express service, with its emphasis on speed-which originated
in rail transportation where the express business had its inception as a personalized service
operating at premium rates over the faster and more dependable schedules of passenger
trains-persisted in the minds of the shipping public. 9 C.A.B. at 488. But see Wilson, Alir
Freight and Air Express, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 37 (1950).
65. Judge Prettyman's conception of the proper role of the competition factor is in-
dicated in the text accompanying note 64 supra. He also regarded surface freight service and
air freight service as "totally dissimilar." "Common sense" suggested that competition be-
tween them was highly improbable. The dissent concluded that the shipper who wished his
goods to move by air could rarely be persuaded to have them carried by rail. 197 F.2d at 392.
1544 [Vol. 71 :1529
ENTRY OF SURFACE CARRIERS
but, in arguing that forwarders with motor connections were no more deser-
vant of authorization than National, he ignored the difference in relative sur-
face investment of such carriers.
By 1955 the Board was prepared to employ a more empirical analysis and
take a closer look at the alleged dangers of surface carrier participation in air
freight forwarding. This time, basing its decision on the virtues of competition,
the Board granted National an exemption. 66 Acknowledging that National
and another rail controlled applicant would possess some competitive ad-
vantages because of their railroad parentage and their pre-eminence in surface
freight forwarding, the CAB stated that the possibility of public detriment
from these factors would be countered by several vigorous, successful air
forwarders which had developed since 1948. The Board was unimpressed by
the evils which would allegedly result from surface carrier participation.
Protestants at the hearing argued that the railroad parents would use their
air freight subsidiaries to destroy independent forwarders by offering "un-
reasonably low" rates and that the Board proceedings aimed at correcting such
rates on complaint of an individual forwarder would prove too lengthy and ex-
pensive to be an adequate remedy. In rejecting these arguments, the Board
suggested that should National engage in rate cutting which seriously en-
dangered the survival of independent forwarders, it would be challenged by
more than a single forwarder or by the Board's staff or both. Furthermore,
the Board noted that the encouragement of lower rates would be in the public
interest and believed that this consideration outweighed what it termed "a
very limited risk of destructive rate competition." As to traffic diversion, the
Board agreed with the examiner that the railroads who controlled these appli-
cants would have more incentive to dissuade shippers from using air freight ser-
vice if their requests for authorization were repeatedly refused than if they. were
granted. The Board conceded that the promotional efforts of these applicants
might not be carried on in a vigorous manner, but pointed out that their
services as air freight forwarders would become available to their numerous
surface customers, thereby increasing the overall use of air freight forwarder
service. Moreover, the Board observed the particular contribution which Uni-
versal and National could make toward stimulating the growth and effective-
ness of air freight services:
In the cases of these two applicants, we also note that the introduction
into air-freight forwarding of organizations having extensive experience
and facilities in the field of surface freight may result in the adaptation
and introduction into air-freight of practices or techniques which con-
tribute to the attractiveness of the service or the efficiency with which
it can be rendered.
68
66. Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 544-46 (1955). Universal Air
Freight, see notes 50 & 60 supra, also applied for and received operating authority.
67. 21 C.A.B. at 545.
68. Id. at 546.
1962] 1545
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In REA, Airfreight Forwarder Application,69 a recent air forwarder pro-
ceeding, REA requested authorization to operate as an international air
freight forwarder. The market that REA was attempting to enter was strictly
that of nondomestic air freight forwarding." Because of the organization
which it had developed to service the domestic, small shipments field, the
Board, accepting the findings of the examiner, found that REA could pro-
vide a useful new service and noted that REA's comprehensive transportation
services, not available elsewhere on the same scale, put it in a position to
generate new international cargo. International air freight forwarding author-
ity for REA, in combination with its existing nationwide facilities, would clearly
provide wider solicitation coverage, faster service, and other advantages of in-
tegrated rail-air service resources. But these very characteristics which would
enable REA to provide a useful new service, according to the CAB, would also
give it an undue competitive advantage resulting in dominance or monopoliza-
tion of international air freight forwarding.71 It was found that since many
of REA's domestic shippers also had a need for international air forwarding
services, the very fact of prior association with these shippers would give REA
a substantial advantage over the other international air freight forwarders.
Moreover, if REA's contention that many shippers then using its services on
the domestic leg of their international shipments would prefer to employ one
transportation company for all their international shipping needs rather than
utilize multicarrier arrangements were true, REA would, if allowed to enter,
be the only transportation company able to offer these shippers this unitary,
superior service.7 2 For these reasons, the Board concluded that REA's domi-
nant position in the domestic, small shipments market would give it a strategic
advantage in obtaining a powerful position in international air freight forward-
ing, and therefore refused to authorize such operations.
73
The examiner also found another major objection to granting authoriza-
tion to REA. That objection was to an admitted attempt by REA to divert
traffic on the domestic leg of international shipments to rail express by en-
gaging in rate competition against air freight forwarders.7 4 At the time of its
69. 27 C.A.B. 500 (1958).
70. Id. at 506. The domestic aspects of international air forwarding include consolidat-
ing shipments and/or breaking bulk at domestic points other than gateway cities-i.e., cities
which are the final points of departure from the United States or the first points of arrival
from overseas or foreign areas. REA did not request authority to perform these domestic
functions.
71. Id. at 535.
72. Because a number of air freight forwarders operate in both the domestic and inter-
national markets, they would seem to be in a position to compete with REA for this business.
For example, a Toledo manufacturer, interested primarily in saving time in the transit of
his shipments, supported REA's application because of the availability to him of REA's
pickup and delivery service at Toledo. Id. at 521. There would seem no reason why the air
freight forwarders could not develop speedy pickup and delivery services of their own to
compete for traffic demanding such handling.
73. See id. at 501.
74. Id. at 512-13.
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application REA had filed a tariff with the Interstate Commerce Commission
which proposed substantial rate reductions for domestic rail express service
of international shipments. If REA were allowed to consolidate air freight in
the port cities, it could offer shippers not only a lower rate on the domestic
segment of the operation but also a one transportation company service for the
forwardering operations. Since REA's rail rates were not under the jurisdic-
tion of the CAB, the Board could not prevent "destructive" and "unfair"
competition between REA and other international air freight forwarders.75
Since the Board has never treated the second proviso of section 408(b) as
a controlling standard in forwarder cases, its experience in this area affords
an opportunity to observe the factors considered relevant in determining
whether entry by any particular surface carrier will promote or inhibit the
policies of the act. Prior to the 1948 proceeding on domestic forwarding, the
Board disposed of cases involving REA and Universal Air Freight Corpora-
tion with little, if any, regard to their surface affiliations. Beginning in 1948,
however, the Board explicitly and directly dealt with the issue of surface car-
rier participation. The most determinative consideration was the likelihood of
a particular applicant's surface connections affording it an "undue" competi-
tive advantage over other air forwarders or leading it to promote surface
business at the expense of air forwarding. Elements which the Board weighed in
favor of permitting air forwarding operations by surface affiliated applicants in-
cluded the fact that the applicant had displayed a willingness and ability to pro-
mote and encourage air traffic, 7 6 that the applicant would face a large number of
competitors in air forwarding,77 and that the applicant had a relatively low
investment in surface facilities. 78 Moreover, the Board looked to whether ship-
pers desiring to utilize air services would be unlikely to transfer their business
to surface carriage,79 whether the operations of the surface parent were
75. In American Express Company, Docket No. 9315 (CAB May 10, 1960) aff'g
Examiner's Recommended Decision (Sept. 30, 1959), protestants to the applicant's request
for international air freight forwarding authority suggested the possibility that Amexco,
the applicant, might misuse its banking connections to promote its proposed air forwarding
service. They contended that through flexible interest rates on deposits and lower com-
mission rates on letters of credit, Amexco would be in a position to grant rebates to forward-
ing customers. The examiner discounted the likelihood of destructive competition in the
air freight forwarding business, noting the highly competitive nature of the industry, its
low entry costs (in terms of capital outlay), and its generally narrow profit margins. He
surmised:
Amexco still is in business to make money. It is inconceivable that they would cut
profits on existing enterprises to obtain a foothold in a highly competitive business
where the only assurance of maintaining that foothold would be at the continued
expense of its other profitable enterprises.
Examiner's Decision at 29. One may wonder why similar sentiments should not have dis-
posed the CAB to be unconcerned about REA's rate cutting on rail express shipments mov-
ing in international commerce.
76. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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geographically separate from the area of an applicant's proposed air opera-
tions,80 and whether the Board would possess power to prevent neglect of
air operations or destructive competition subsequent to entry.81 The absence
or obverse of some or all of these factors resulted in a denial of the application.
Toward a Discretionary Approach
The Board's approach in the forwarder cases-that of weighing various con-
siderations in determining the propriety of entry into indirect air carriage by
surface carrier affiliates-suggests a workable alternative to the "controlling
standard" treatment afforded to the second proviso in direct carrier cases. Al-
though the CAB has discretion to undertake a multifactoral approach in all
cases in which the applicant is a forwarder, where the applicant requests
authorization for direct air carriage, the Board may only employ this approach
if the applicant is a surface carrier applying for a certificate in its own name.82
Where the applicant seeking entry into direct air carriage is a subsidiary
of a surface carrier, the Board is compelled by the Pan American doctrine to
apply the second proviso as a controlling standard.83 Were Pan American
reversed, the Board would be able to utilize the suggested "discretionary"
approach in all cases in which the surface carrier seeks to "build" into air
transportation. The rationale for reversing Pan American is the "building-
buying" distinction which is suggested by the terms and structure of the
statute.8 4 Once it is determined that the creation of a subsidiary is not an
"acquisition," section 408 is not triggered in a section 401 proceeding and the
second proviso is no longer controlling. The Board would then be free to con-
sider the policy ascribed to the second proviso in the course of applying the
recommended multifactoral approach. This approach would better enable the
Board to promote the policies of the act. Treating the second proviso as con-
trolling in licensing proceedings prohibits entry by surface carriers in many
cases in which such entry would result in "encouragement and development"
of air transportation, "promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges," and "competition to the extent necessary
to assure the sound development' of the air industry.85 For instance, steam-
ship companies possessing a familiarity with world trade which might be
utilized to aid expansion of United States air commerce 86 are automatically
barred from air operations when section 408 is directly applied. The same is
true for surface carriers possessing facilities and agents which could be em-
ployed in air transportation, thereby leading to economies of operation.8 7 Such
80. See note 60 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
82. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
85. See § 2,52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
86. See American President Lines, 7 C.A.B. 799, 808 (1947) (Chairman Landis, con-
curring).
87. Ibid.
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economies, when passed on to shippers and passengers through better service
and lower rates, would stimulate and enhance use of air carriage. Moreover, sur-
face carriers may be the most effective and perhaps, in some instances, the only
source of new competition to existing air carriers.88 Because of these potential
advantages, it would seem appropriate for the Board, in any particular case,
to ascertain whether the alleged evils of surface carrier participation are actual-
ly present and to weigh the existence of such evils, where found, against the
probable benefits which would result from entry.
One of the evils alleged to result from surface carrier participation in air
transportation is that:
by reason of their superior resources and extensive facilities for solicita-
tion, such carriers would often be the possessors of powerful competitive
weapons which would enable them to crush the competition of inde-
pendent air carriers.89
The presumption that entry by a carrier with strong surface affiliations is
likely to interfere with attaining the objectives of the act is highly questionable.
It will be recalled that, in the 1948 proceeding involving domestic air freight
forwarding, the Board excluded rail controlled applicants because it feared that
they would be in a position to employ their parents' facilities to the detri-
ment of other air forwarders.90 But in 1955, the Board observed that several
vigorous, successful forwarder enterprises had since developed.9 1 The Board
seemed to find that several of these competitors were no longer "infants," in
need of protection, but were sufficiently "mature" to provide the competitive
check needed to ensure that the participation of railroad subsidiaries would
be beneficial to air freight forwarding. Thus, rail affiliated applicants which
previously had been denied entry were authorized. The present state of de-
velopment of the direct air carriage industry would seem to render the Board's
1955 performance more pertinent than its action in 1948. For as one article
on new carrier entry has concluded:
The growth of air transportation and its current strength is one of the
very reasons why entry by new carriers would involve no impairment of
the operation of the older carriers.
92
88. The present situation in British aviation suggests that shipping interests will most
likely be a potential source of competition against established air carriers. The Civil Aviation
(Licensing) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 c. 38, was passed as part of the Conservatives' policy
to encourage competition on the part of British "independents" against the "corporations"-
Britain's two nationalized airlines, British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and
British European Airways (BEA)-which until then had been the "chosen instruments" of
British air transport. In this particular attempt to secure new competition, surface carrier
affiliates were the principal source, since ocean shipping interests are the prime owners of
Britain's two major independent airlines. See Aviation Week, May 22, 1961, pp. 34-35.
89. American President Lines, 7 C.A.B. 799, 803 (1947).
90. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
92. Maclay and Burt, Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air Trans-
portation, 22 J. AiR L. & Com. 131, 151 (1955).
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With regard to the argument that an applicant's surface connections will give
it a competitive advantage over other air carriers, several comments seem war-
ranted. Frequently such a statement is an assertion rather than a finding.
Since a new entrant is often at a disadvantage to existing competitors, it
should not be presumed that surface carrier parentage will do any more than
equalize the competitive abilities of new and existing competitors. Further-
more, to the extent that the surface affiliated entrant has an advantage based
upon its superior efficiency, entrance would seem warranted by the statu-
tory mandate instructing the Board to promote "adequate, economical, and
efficient service" and to encourage "competition to the extent necessary to as-
sure the sound development" of air transportation. Finally, should the entrant
in fact engage in rate cutting which the Board considers "destructive competi-
tion," the Board's power to establish minimum rates seems adequate to prevent
such practices.
93
Another charge levelled against surface carrier participation is that a con-
flict of interest would develop between the promotion of air and surface ser-
vices.94 This charge is directed at both a sin of omission and of commission. The
passive danger is that a surface controlled air carrier will not vigorously pro-
mote air transportation; the active one is that the surface parent will use its
air subsidiary to "divert" normal air traffic to its surface operations. The fear
that an entrant with substantial investment in surface facilities will fail to
promote air service seems chimerical as well as contradictory of the Board's
contention that air carriers with extensive surface resources will compete so
vigorously that independent air carriers will be driven from markets which
they already serve. Relative investment is not a meaningful criterion for de-
termining whether an applicant's surface connections will impair the vigor of
its air carriage promotion. 95 Once a firm has made its fixed investment6, it
will devote its variable resources to the employment which secures the greatest
return on such resources. So long as air carriage brings a greater return per
additional dollar of expenditure than surface carriage, a firm should continue
to expend available funds for the promotion of the former. Where an ap-
plicant's affiliated surface operations are in a market geographically separate
from that of its proposed air operations or the air service is found to be in a
different line of commerce from the surface operations,96 utilization of variable
93. See § 403, 52 Stat. 992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1958).
94. American President Lines, 7 C.A.B. 799, 803 (1947) :
Surface carriers engaging in air transportation would at times be under a strong
incentive to act for protection of their investment in surface transportation interests.
95. Even if comparative surface-air investment were a proper indicium of the probable
extent of air carriage promotion, direct air operations require substantial capital investment.
Under the present interpretation of § 408(b), which applies to direct air carriers seeking
entry by real or paper acquisitions, the Board is not even afforded the discretion to consider
the relative air-surface investment. The presumption is that surface carrier participation in
air operations will violate the policies of the act.
96. American Export Airlines and its parent, Steamship Company, operated in neither
the same geographical market nor the same line of commerce. Airlines held a certificate for
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resources for the purposes of promoting air traffic will be detrimental to its
surface operations only to the extent that such funds might have been em-
ployed in the promotion of surface traffic. Where, however, the air and sur-
face operations are in the same geographical market and are fungible, the
promotion of air service may actually divert existing traffic from a company's
surface facilities to its air facilities. Whether this situation will in fact inhibit
the promotion of air traffic should depend on the relative, anticipated profit
yields from the two types of service. Thus, the criteria which the Board should
consider in determining the importance of conflicting interests are the expected
profits from air and surface operations in the market for which the applicant
seeks authority. The fear of actual diversion of traffic from air to surface
operations also seems unrealistic, for it is difficult to see why a surface carrier
would be more likely to attempt such diversion after it invested in air facilities
than prior to such investment. Indeed, the Board has argued persuasively
that surface carriers have greater incentive to divert air traffic when applicants
which they control are refused authorization than when permission is granted.
97
These observations strongly suggest that a presumption against granting
surface carriers authority to engage in air operations is unwarranted. The ob-
jectives of the act would best be advanced if the Board examined the probable
consequences of entry in the light of the relevant circumstances of each case.
Relevant considerations suggested by this Comment include the number and
strength of competitors already serving the market which the surface carrier
seeks to enter, the geographical overlap of the surface carrier's operations with
the proposed air service, the extent to which the surface and air operations are
considered interchangeable by passengers and shippers, and the relative ex-
pected profits of the applicant's air and surface operations. The past per-
formance in air or surface carriage of a surface affiliated applicant or its
parent should also be considered as an aid to predicting future conduct. Absent
a finding that entry will be detrimental to air carriage, participation in air
service between New York and Lisbon, Portugal, not being operated, and was engaged in
air transportation between New York and Foynes, Ireland. American Export Airlines,
Inc., 3 C.A.B. 619, at 620-21. The Board noted on reargument:
Steamship Company is primarily a freight carrier and has never operated to any port
in the British Isles, and prior to the present war it made only an occasional stop at
Lisbon on westbound voyages.
American Export Lines, 4 C.A.B. 104, at 108. Further, Member Ryan, in a concurring
opinion, insisted that Steamship Company, having found the cost of luxury liners prohibi-
tive, resorted to the alternative plan of entering transatlantic air carriage, and concluded:
It is contemplated that the luxury passenger traffic will travel by air, while the re-
maining passenger traffic and freight will be handled by the modernized passenger
and cargo fleet which Steamship Company intends to acquire. Thus, each enterprise
will seek a different class of traffic.
3 C.A.B. at 629-30.
97. See Airfreight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 546 (1955). For discussion
of this case, see text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
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transportation by a surface carrier controlled applicant should not be precluded
merely because of the applicant's parentage. 98
The desire of surface carriers to sprout wings is understandable; it un-
doubtedly stems from an acute awareness of the trends in transportation. In
1960, for example, more than twice as many travelers chose to cross the
Atlantic via a six-hour jet flight than a five-day ocean voyage. Further,
the number of those flying in 1960 marked a 25 per cent gain over the number
choosing that mode of crossing in 1959.99 A multifactoral approach would re-
move artificial legal barriers to entry by surface carriers and thereby permit
some of their resources-especially their solicitation systems and the talent
gained from their experience in transporting goods and people-to be converted
from modes of surface carriage to the expanding enterprise of air transportation.
98. On March 10, 1959, Senator John M. Butler, at the request of the railroad industry,
introduced a bill calling for the removal of the restrictions which currently exist on surface
carrier participation in air transportation. S. 1354, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The first
section of the bill would have disallowed the CAB to apply any "special or different
standards, requirements, or burden of proof," or to attach or prescribe any terms, conditions,
or limitations "merely by reason of the fact that a person affected by such a proceeding,
whether as an applicant or otherwise" is or is controlled by or affiliated with a carrier other
than an air carrier. The second section of the bill would have repealed the second proviso of
§ 408(b). Were this bill enacted, the multifactoral approach, advocated in this Comment
for entry cases, could be applied in merger or acquisition cases as well.
99. Newsweek, June 19, 1961, pp. 76-77.
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